Appendices to the Secretary General’s Mechanism

The request for an investigation of an alleged use of CBT weapons to be submitted to the Secretary-General should describe the basis for the request, including as far as possible the following information:

1.    Description of the trigger(s) of suspicion of alleged use of CBT weapons (e.g., outbreak of non-endemic disease, specific event), including the date, time, and subsequent timeline of events related to the alleged use

2. Tentative conclusion regarding alleged attack and, if possible and/or desirable, identification of possible perpetrator

3.    Identification of the location

        (a) location name

        (b) geographic (GPS) co-ordinates

        (c) in relation to another known location (by direction and distance)

4.     Characteristics of the site(s)

        (a) military (type)

        (b) civil (city, rural area, town, buildings affected)

        (c) nature of the terrain (relief, vegetation)

        (d) accessibility of the site

5.     Meteorological conditions

6.     Methods of dissemination used

        (a) weapons:

          (i) aerial bombs

          (ii) rockets

          (iii) artillery

             (iv) spray devices

              (v) others

          (b) animal and arthropod vectors

          (c) others (e.g., air, food, water)

7.       Extent of the weapons used

          (a) surface(s) affected

          (b) number and duration of weapons used

8.       Characteristics of the possible CBT agent

          (a) preliminary identification

                                    (b) type, consistency, and persistency of contamination

                                          (i) contamination of equipment and buildings

                                    (c) formulation

                                    (d) transmissibility

9.                                  Effects on humans

                                    (a) estimated number of fatalities

                                    (b) number of victims

                                          (i) hospitalized

                                          (ii) other

                                    (c) signs and symptoms

                                           (i) at the time of the attack

                                           (ii) delayed onset

                                          (d) epidemiological data

                                   (e) treatments and/or other countermeasures used

                                   (f) response to treatments and/or countermeasures

10.                               Effects on animals

                                   (a) signs and symptoms

                                   (b) epidemiological data

                                   (c) treatments and/or other countermeasures used

                                   (d) response to treatments and/or countermeasures

11.                               Effects on vegetation and crops

                                   (a) signs of contamination

                                   (b) signs and symptoms

                                   (c) epidemiological data

                                   (d) treatments and/or other countermeasures used

                                   (e) response to treatments and/or countermeasures

12.                              Samples

                                   (a) types of samples identified in situ, including any unexploded munitions or remnants of munitions

                                   (b) types of samples analyzed

                                   (c) results of available analyses

                                   (d) types of samples accompanying the report

                                   (e) documentation system for the sampling process

13.                               Request for medical assistance, and the nature of such assistance

14.                               Request for technical assistance (detection, decontamination etc.)

15.                               If the requesting state and the receiving state are the same, for planning purposes, indication of the modalities and                                             assistance available to support an investigation:

                                   (a) logistics

                                             (i) transportation

                                             (ii) housing

                                             (iii) food/water

                                             (iv) utilities

                                   (b) medical support:

                                              (i) for collection of clinical samples

                                              (ii) for the investigation team

                                   (c) sample storage

                                              (i) secure storage location

                                              (ii) refrigeration

                                   (d) interpreters

                                   (e) expertise in dangerous good packaging, transport

                                   (f) point of entry or other suggested safe routes of access for the team to the investigation site(s)

                                   (g) 24-hour point of contact, including telephone, e-mail, and facsimile.

1.          Name of expert.

2.          Fields of expertise.

3.          Current position.

4.          Mailing address: Office and Home.

5.          Telephone numbers, e-mail address, telex, telecopy or telefax.

6.          Educational background. Attach curriculum vitae.

7.          Relevant experience, particularly in the area of field investigations, including dates of relevant activities.

8.          Relevant training and certifications in: 1) health and safety in a hazardous environment; 2) utilization of

             personal protective equipment; 3) packaging and transport of dangerous goods; and 4) field epidemiology training program.

9.          Language proficiency.

10.        Citizenship.

11.        Availability of services on short notice; availability for extended periods of time.

12.       24-hour point of contact in country, including telephone, facsimile, and e-mail, if available, who can authorize

            deployment of the individual.

13.      Certain health conditions may influence the advisability of deploying an expert to the field.

                 (a) Does the expert have any health conditions that would influence field deployment?

                        Yes or No

                       Prior to deployment as a qualified expert, the expert will be required to have their overall health status confirmed with a medical examination.

                  (b) Relevant vaccination status.

Pre-deployment training: Please note that the UN requires specific training (e.g., security training) prior to field deployment. Baseline training may be relatively brief (e.g., 2 1/2 hours), but additional training may be required. All training will be provided.

In the event of any change in the status in any of the above, the member state is required to notify the Secretary-General.

Individuals designated by Member States will be asked to accept a confidentiality agreement covering any activities conducted on behalf of the Secretary-General for the purposes of investigating the alleged use of CBT weapons.

The equipment and supplies needed for a particular
investigation will be determined in a pre-mission assessment. The
Secretary-General may ask for the assistance of member states and international
organizations in providing equipment and supplies in the following categories:

• personal protection;
• agent detection;
• decontamination;
• environmental and biomedical sample collection and field analysis;
• first aid/health care;
• documentation of evidence collection;
• communications; and,
• other logistical needs.

The following list describes the principal areas in which the Member States could designate experts in areas
such as medicine, veterinary medicine, plant health, microbiology, chemistry,
toxicology, and epidemiology. Where possible, Member States should designate
experts who have acquired working experience in the field. In their fields of competence, these
experts should be familiar with the effects of CBT agents and weapons and
should be skilled at sample collection and preparation. They should also be
able to conduct appropriate interviews.

1.Methodologies of in situ detection and analysis of CBT agents.

2.Evaluation of the effects of CBT weapons on humans, and any correlation between the effects and the identification of the types of CBT agent concerned. Desired skills include clinical toxicology, infectious disease medicine, microbiology, virology, and field epidemiology.

3. Evaluation of the effects of other types of weapons on humans.

4. Evaluation of the effects of CBT weapons on animals, and any correlation between the effects and the identification of the
types of agent concerned. Desired skills include veterinary toxicology, infectious disease diagnostics, microbiology, field epidemiology, and virology.

5. Expertise in field investigation of human, animal, and plant disease.

6.Evaluation of the effects of CBT weapons on plants. Desired skills include plant pathology, plant microbiology, and plant virology.

7.Application of methods of diagnosing infectious diseases, if possible rapidly

8. Conduct of autopsies and post-mortem sample-taking.

9. Determination of local medical and health conditions (with knowledge of conditions preceding the alleged use of CBT weapons).

10. Determination of local ecological conditions (including microbiological aspects).

11. Epidemiological investigation of an alleged use event.

12. Evaluation of the design and military use of CBT means of warfare.

13. Evaluation of the design and military use of non-CBT means of warfare.

14. Evaluation of the health and safety aspects of an investigation.

15. Evaluation and rendering safe of military and improvised explosive devices.

16. Expertise in forensics.

Appendix II provides the form that should be completed in order for Member States to propose
an expert to the Secretary-General for service in the investigation of an
alleged use event.

The following list describes the principal areas in
which the Member States could designate
laboratories in areas such as toxicology, microbiology, and analytical chemistry. The designated laboratories should have
adequate biosafety levels, containment,
physical security and associated procedures to safeguard the dangerous pathogens
and highly toxic chemicals likely to be involved in an investigation. In addition, the designated laboratories should have
some or all of the following capabilities relevant to analyses on
samples from an investigation.

1. Identification, in all the types of sample, of known chemical warfare agents, as well as their impurities and their degradation productions (and evaluation of quantities).

2. Identification and elucidation, in all the types of sample, of the structure of toxic agents, including those present in trace quantities (and evaluation of quantities).

3. Identification and characterization, in different kinds of samples, including clinical and environmental samples, of biological
warfare agents (bacteria, viruses, others) and/or toxins.

4. Identification and characterization, in different kinds of samples, including clinical and environmental samples, of biological
agents (bacteria, viruses, others) and/or toxins.

5. Evaluation of the effects of biological warfare agents and toxins, including epidemiological and ecological modeling.

6. Pathological and biochemical examination of organs and tissue taken from victims of CBT weapons, and where possible identification of the agent concerned.

7. Expertise in investigation and diagnosis of animal or plant diseases, which may include toxicology, pathology, microbiology, and epidemiology.

8. Examination and evaluation of munitions, munition components, and other military delivery devices, including all their
technical specifications; analysis of explosives.

1. Name of laboratory.

2. Point of contact for the laboratory.

3. Mailing address, and, if available, web address.

4. Telephone number(s) and e-mail.

5. Field(s) of expertise (See appendix IV).

6. Describe the level of containment and toxic handling capabilities of the laboratory. Give the biosafety level of the laboratory and describe the capabilities, to include staff competency,
facilities, equipment, and, where applicable, permits to handle biological materials.

7. Relevant experience, including training and competencies of staff.

8. Specification of any particular requirements for preparation of samples.

9. Specification of any particular requirements or legal limitations with respect to customs or other inspections for the movement of samples for analysis, particularly for the requirements for the import of samples.

10. Specification of the number of samples able to accept and any fees and responsibilities for services carried out on behalf of the Secretary-General.

11.Quality management, assurance and control, including accreditation or certification (e.g., ISO/IEC 17025, GLP, ISO 9001); international and national reference functions, and participation in international laboratory networks and/or inter-laboratory proficiency tests.

12. 24-hour point of contact in the Member State authorizing selection of the laboratory, including mailing address, telephone, facsimile, and e-mail address.

Laboratoriesdesignated by Member States will be asked to accept a confidentiality agreement
covering any analysis conducted on behalf of the Secretary-General for the purposes of investigating
the alleged use of CBT weapons.

A stringent regime should be established to govern the collection, handling, transport, and analysis of samples taken to support the investigation of alleged use of CBT weapons. Where possible, internationally recognized protocols for the collection of environmental and clinical samples should be followed. Experts with the requisite sample collection skills will be able to utilize these protocols readily to collect the various types of samples that could pertain to an investigation, such as:

• neat agent, munitions, remnants of munitions, other military delivery devices;
• NBC clothing and respirator canisters;
• environmental samples;
• food and drinking water;
• biomedical samples from human or animal sources; and,
• any affected crops and other vegetation.

During pre-mission planning consultations with the laboratories likely to analyze environmental samples should be undertaken to establish the appropriate amount to be collected for various kinds of environmental samples.

When the alleged event could be of biological origin, the initiation of the event may have occurred several days or weeks before the Secretary-General is asked to investigate. During pre-mission planning and upon arrival at the investigation site, the Secretary-General’s experts should identify and consider the samples collected earlier by other local, national, and relevant international authorities and organizations. In particular, the team should consider whether to accept the analysis of these samples, to re-test such samples, or to re-take and analyze some or all samples. Moreover, the investigatory team should seek to include such samples and/or the sample analysis in the records of the investigation.

As samples are taken, the investigative team should initiate appropriate chain-of-custody procedures (e.g., documentation, secure storage) and carry them through to the point at which samples are destroyed. The chain of custody form below illustrates the basic process of chain-of-custody. To preserve their integrity, samples should be placed in suitable material and stored and shipped at the appropriate temperature. As needed, the investigation team should pre-screen samples, such as those taken from bomb fragments or devices, for non-biological material (e.g., explosives, radioactive material) prior to shipment.

Field assays may assist with preliminary screening of samples and help ensure the health and safety of the investigators. Where possible, an analysis of samples may be conducted on site. On-site analysis capabilities and standards may be sufficient to enable definitive identification and characterization of chemical samples. However, particularly for biological samples, any analysis conducted in the field should be confirmed according to the process described in paragraph 97 d (ii).

Click here to view the Chain of Custody form.

Interviews may be an important element of a fact finding mission. Therefore, ample consideration should be given the need for and the modalities of interviews in the planning of a mission. Such planning should consider the involvement and consent of the Member State receiving the investigation. Any questionnaires employed should be directly related to the investigation of alleged use of CBT weapons. Applicable epidemiological, medical, veterinary medical, and other questionnaires have been developed by relevant international organizations. During pre-mission planning, the expert(s) should work from those models to tailor a questionnaire to the circumstances at hand, as indicated in Appendix A. Interviews should be conducted to elicit information pertinent to the investigation and with consideration to tailoring interview techniques to reflect cultural factors that might otherwise inhibit eliciting of useful information. Interview roles and responsibilities should be assigned with, at a minimum, the designation of which team member will serve as the lead interviewer and which team member will record comments.

Investigators should ask unambiguous questions. They should refrain as far as possible from leading witnesses or victims and should leave them to say what they saw, heard or felt. Interviews should be conducted with openness to the possibility that the interview may reveal unexpected information. In such instances, the interviewer should ask follow-up questions appropriate to develop possible investigative leads.

The witnesses/victims should be asked to illustrate their account by drawing a sketch map of the area of the incident and, if possible, diagramming any munitions and/or devices and markings on those items.

All interviews should be recorded. The investigation team will inform all interviewees that it will handle all interview data in a confidential manner.

When the Secretary-General decides to initiate an
investigation of the alleged use of CBT weapons, pre-mission planning should immediately be initiated. Pre-mission planning includes a variety of activities.

The Secretary-General should convene expert(s) to assess the health, safety, and security risks that the team could reasonably anticipate during the mission based on the information provided by the requesting state (see Appendix 1) and all sources of pertinent, data available to the Secretary-General. As new data becomes available, the state requesting the investigation should update the information that it provides to the Secretary-General. The investigating team should reassess the health, safety, and security risks as it arrives at the investigation site and periodically throughout the mission.

The expert(s) should also develop a mission plan that consists of several elements, including the following:

• a sample collection and analysis plan;
• an interview plan;
• resource requirements;
• logistics plan, and,
• command and control plan.

The sampling plan. Specific to the alleged event, the expert(s) should articulate the appropriate measures to establish whether CBT’ weapons have been used. The expert(s) should work out the details of the sampling plan in consultation with the laboratories likely to perform the sample analysis. The sampling plan should include:

• the sample collection strategy and techniques to be used, including sampling from locations where the agent might naturally concentrate;
• the amount of samples to be collected, based on available guidelines for sampling and in
  consultation with laboratories likely to perform sample analysis;
• the materials and storage conditions, including packing for shipment, necessary to preserve the integrity
  of samples during storage and transportation;
• analysis methods to be employed;
• identification of samples previously taken by other authorities and organizations and consideration of how
  such samples might factor into the investigation; and,
• consideration of any special requirements for chain of custody, shipment of samples, including initiation of clearances with carriers and the Member State(s) involved.

This sampling plan should be refined once the team is on location.

The interview plan. During the pre-mission planning process, the expert(s) should create an interview plan
specific to the circumstances known from the risk assessment. Working from medical, epidemiological, and other (e.g., veterinary) questionnaires developed by relevant international organizations, the experts should tailor interview
questionnaires (See Appendix IX.).

Resource requirements and logistics. Based on the risk assessment and the mission plan, the expert(s) should make several
recommendations to the Secretary-General regarding the resources required for
the upcoming mission:

• the type and number of experts appropriate for the investigation;
• the type and amount of equipment required to ensure the health and safety of the team and to enable the anticipated investigatory tasks; and,
• the type and number of laboratories selected to perform sample analysis.

As the Secretary-General selects and assembles the investigation team, the expert(s) should plan the appropriate medical support for the team and consider whether any additional training is required for the mission location. The expert(s) should also plan for the interpretation needs for witness and medical interviews and other investigation activities.

To support the team’s deployment to the field, the following activities will be necessary:

• signing of relevant agreements by experts to be deployed;
• fitting of personal protective equipment;
• personnel travel planning, including passports and visas;
• arrangements for the transport of the equipment required for the investigation; and,
• if appropriate, additional training.

Among other factors pertinent to the conduct of the investigation, the Secretary-General
will want to establish with the receiving Member State the proper assurances that the equipment and personnel
for the investigation mission will be cleared for entry into, movement within, and exit from the Member State.
The Secretary-General will also want to seek the cooperation of the receiving Member State in facilitating the
investigation team’s communications while in country either by: 1) identifying acceptable radio frequencies or, 2) providing communication means for the investigation team.

Organization of the investigating team. Clear command and control is essential to the efficiency and success of an investigatory mission. Command and control principles should be set during the pre-mission planning process and clearly understood among the investigative team to establish authority, responsibility, and accountability among team members. Among other things, command and control principles should clarify:

• rules of the investigation, including permissible and non-permissible activities;
• chain of command;
• specific functions and tasks of various team members;
• channels of communication;
• agreed protocols for tasks; and,
• the agreed priority and schedule for tasks.

The expert(s) may recommend that an individual be identified and designated to manage the collection, chain of custody, storage, and transport of samples.

The Secretary-General will designate a team leader for this investigation mission. Unless another team member is authorized to function in this capacity, the team leader will be the point of contact for interaction with United Nations Headquarters and host authorities.

Pre-planning should be accomplished in a time-efficient manner in order to be able to deploy an investigative team promptly.

All expert consultants and experts as well as any diagnostic and analytical laboratories will be required to undertake to preserve the confidentiality of all information associated with an investigation of alleged use of CBT weapons. In this regard, it is recognized that the Member State receiving the investigation team may control access to sensitive information and areas and may also designate specific information provided to the investigative team as confidential.

The investigation team should file a report that elaborates its activities, the evidence found, and the team’s findings. The report could be modeled on the format that follows, adjusted as needed.

Executive summary

Pre-investigation activities

Investigation activities

Findings

Appendices:

         Data from state requesting investigation

         Terms of reference (e.g., authorizing letter)

          Administrative data

                  Investigation location

                  Team personnel

          Non-destructive evaluation

          List of samples taken

          List of other evidence collected

                 By the investigative team

                 Obtained from other authorities or relevant international organizations

          Results of analysis and clinical diagnostics

                 Sample analysis: laboratory 1

                 Sample analysis: laboratory 2

                 Sample analysis: laboratory 3 (if necessary)

          Records of interviews conducted

          List of medical investigation activities

                 Summary, clinical data on patients Epidemiological investigation report

                 Breakdown of medical cases examined

                 List of plant and animal investigation activities

                 Data summary regarding affected plants, animals Epidemiological investigation report

                 Breakdown of cases examined

         Record of chain of custody activities

         Record of tags and seals

 Should there be individual opinion(s) differing from the majority of investigators, they should be reflected in the investigative report.